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Snmrrier List l, Sheet 3
No. 74-1471
TSC INDUSTRIES, INC.

v.
NORTHWAY, INC.
SUMMARY:

-----

---

Resp Northway, plaintiff below, is a holder of the securities of

TSC Industries, petr here and defendant below.

Petr TSC was acquired by petr

National Industries, Inc., in a stock- for - stock purchase.

Resp filed suit under § l4(a )

of the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34, alleging that the joint proxy statement filed by
TSC and National Industries in connection with the exchange offer was materially
misleading in its omission of certain details of the interrclati<:''1ship of the merger
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1/
On res p 1 s motion for su mmary judgment on the is sue of liability, USDC

partners.

-

'

.

(N.D. Ill) (McLaren ) denied the motion since materiality of the omissions was not
established as a matter of law and was a jury question.

--------

On § ·1292 appeal, the 7th

Circuit reversed, holding that certain omissions were material as a matter of lav-'
since they were

11

of such a character that [they l might have been considered

important by a reasonable shareholder.

11

Petrs now seek review by cert of CA 7 1 s

decision arguing:
(a) the standard for materiality expounded by CA 7 is
in direct conflict with the 11 significant propensity 11 test
adopted in Mills v. Electric Auto- Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970), and with the decisions of various CA's;
(b) CA 7 erred in holding the omissions involved in this
case to be material as a matter of law.
FACTS:
I,\._../

After acquiring 34o/o of TSC 1 s stock and placing five of its nominees

on TSC's board of directors, National Industries proposed that TSC sell its assets to
National in exchange for National stock.

This sale of assets and liquidation reatJired c.

shareholder vote under state corporate law and, as required by § 14(a) of the 1934 Ac:,
TSC and National distributed a proxy statement to their shareholders.

-- --

The non-

National nominees on the TSC board unanimonsly approved the proposed asset

---...

--~

acquisition and liqnidation as did the TSC shareholders.

After the 1nerger was

I

cu1rxW1ated, resp Northway bronght this snit, alleging, inter alia, certain material
omissions in the proxy statement.

1/
Resp also filed certain claims against the controlling shareholders of TSC
which are not here in is sne.
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(

First, re s p noted that th e prox y s t a tenent failed to note that TSC a nd Na ti ona 1
had filed Schednle 13 d 1 s with the SEC as reqnir ~ d by § 13d of the 19 34 Ac t s t a tin g t!:c.t
National conld be deemed the
reason of its 33% of TSC.

11

parent 11 of TSC within the

meari.~ng

of that pro v ision by

Beyond this, althongh the proxy statement did note that

~:.

ont of the 10 TSC directors were National nominees, it failed to note that National 1 s
President and Vice- President were respectively Chairmen of the TSC board of
directors and execntive committee.

Witho,,t snbstantial explanation, CA 7 held th es e

omissions to be material as a matter of law.

Petn at 13a-14a.

Second, althongh the proxy statement revealed the cnrrent market val,e of tl:e
shares of National to be received by TSC shareholders [$16. 19 per common share oi

''

-..'of an nnderwriter that the received shares
TSC], it failed to inclnde the prediction
......_.
~

would bring only $14.50 per TSC share after the exchange dne to a dim.Hnitioa in v a l• · e
of certain National warrants incl,ded in the package.

The predicted change in v alne

wonld rednce the premi,,m over present valne received by the TSC shareholders fr on:
$3. 23 per TSC share to $1. 48 per share.
to be obvio,s.

CA 7 held the materiality of this omissi on

Petn at 18a.

Finally CA 7 fonnd it a material omission to fail to disclose the fact that
National had retained as a $12,000 a year consnltant the President of a m,t,al f,n d
which had p11rchased s•,bstantial qnantities of National stock amo•,nting to abo,t sa?
of the yearly float in National. This was tr11e since some shareholders might h a\·e
drawn an inference of coll,sion from these facts.
CONTENTIONS:

( 1) CA 7 at some length expo•,nds its view of materi a lit y :c::

p,rposes of § 14(a) and Rnle 14a-9.

-

It conclndes that the corr e ct test is

11

w het he!"

the omitted fact 1s of s11ch a character that it might ,have been considered i m.por tar.:

- 4 a re a sonable sha ·ebo lder wh o w as in the process of determining how to vote.
Petn at 5a-12a.

Drawing snpport from Affiliated Ute

11

itizens v. United States, 406

------------~---------~----~~

(2nd Cir. 1973 ), and Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co. , 489 F. 2d 5 79, 604 (5th Cir.
1974), cert denied,

---

u.s. - - -

( 1975 ), the CA stated that relevancy alone is the

only test of materiality [Petn. at lOa, n. 131.
t

,....

It specifically rejected the significant

....

propensity test adopted by the USDC as well as other CA.
Petr understandably argues that the Circuits are badly split on the question of
the standard for materiality for purposes of the federal securities disclosure laws
[Cases collected in petn at 8-91 as well as finding the
supported by Mills.

11

significant propensity 11 test

It notes that the omitted facts are not required by any SEC

.....

guideline
on disclosure.
.
,_.~..

A, proxy statement is not formulated in a laboratory, as

CA 7 assumes, bnt in the real world by fallible draftsmen and any proxy statement
or other disclosure statement omits material which might have been considered
I

important by some shareholder, at least when viewed retrospectively.

'<
Resp generally renews the CA 1 s holding, arguing that it merely repeats the
Mills test.

It argues that petr seeks to create a conflict ont of a mere ethereal

difference in wording.
matter of law.

Under any standard these omissions were material as a

And for the Court to consider this question would be shoveling smoke.

It also urges that CA 7 1 s decision can be supported on the alternate grounds of

governing state law and Rule 14a-3 --neither of which were considered below.
(2) Petr urges that CA 7 clearly mistJsed its snmmary judgment power in

I

foreclosing this issne from jury consideration-- no matter what standard is applied.

- 5 (

How, for example, could the failnre to disclose the fact that National officials,

named in the proxy as TSC directors as well a~ officers of National, were chairme o
of the TSC board and executive committee possibly be material as a matter of law
in light of the disclosures in the proxy that National controlled 3 3% of TSC' s stock
as well as 5 of 10 directors.
Resp 1uges that s11mmary jndgment was clearly correct.
DISCUSSION:

The case appears to be an outside candidate for cert.

The

granting of summary judgment is difficult to defend and perhaps completely untenable
on all questions save omission of the underwriter's prediction.

This issne wonld not

appear to be independently certworthy.
There is a clear split in circuits on the standard for materiality.

It snrely

'must be something more than mere relevancy unless filings, prospectuses, and
proxy statements are to become encyclopedias.

On the other hand, as Jndge

Friend l~.-

opinion in Gerstle indicated, the particnlar verbal formnla utilized by a conrt may
be more smoke than essence.
There is a response.
O'Neill
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Motion of Respondent to Dispense
with Printing Appendix

INDUSTRIES, INC.
v.

NORTHWAY, INC.
On October 6 1 the Court granted cert to CA 7 in this case to consider
the standard for materiality under §14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Respondent (joined by petr in a separate reply) moves to dispense with
printing an appendix and to permit the case to be heard on the original record
together with nine letter size xeroxed sets of relevant parts of the record.
Petr initially designated about 1 1 500 pages to be printed as the Appendix.
apparently concerned that it may have to bear such

cost~

Resp,

if the case is reversed,

see Rules 36(3) and 57(2) and (3) 1 attempted to persuade petr to include less.
Unsuccessful 1 resp files this motion1 suggesting as an alternative that the Court

perm1t xeroxed. cop1es o1 tfie rec ord to be filea.

esp sent the Clerk for his

inspection a set of the xeroxed appendix used in the CA.
are clear and the letter sized volumes are firmly bound.
joins

r~sp

in this motion.

The reproductions
Petr, in a reply brief,

Both cite the high costs of printing--$20-25, 000, as

compared to the relatively low cost of xeroxing, about $3, 500.
DISCUSSION: As noted in my memorandum on the motion in Drew
Municipal Separate School Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, List 3, Sheet 3
this Conference, there have been a few of these motions filed this term.

As set

out in the Drew memorandum., the clear intent of Rule 36 is to discourage
voluminous appendices, tha t an appendix should set out only relevant docket
e ntries , etc. and only those other parts of the record to which the parties wish
to direct the Court's particular attention.

As with counsel in Drew, the members

of the bar in this case have likewise failed "to discern" the purpose of Rule 36.
Again, the parties may be just putting their motion badly.

(As in Drew,

the -cer t petition in this case contains the opinion below, as well as the relevant
portion of the proxy statement, the Exchange Act and certain Rules of the S. E. C.).
However, to grant the motion on the ground given--cost--would only encourage
fur ther motions of this typeJl and verbose and xeroxed appendices.
The provision of Rule 36(8) that the Court may by order dispense with
the requirement of an appendix and may permit cases to be heat:d on the original
recordJl "with such copies of the record, or relevant parts thereof, as the Court
may require" should be reserved only for extraordinary situations such as in the
Calley motion, see List 3, Sheet 4, October 10 Conference, where the opinions
(required by Rule 36(1 )) ran several hundred pages.
Also, Rule 36(3) provides protection to resp:

"The cost of producing the appendix
shall be taxed as costs in the case, but if
either party shall cause matter to be included
in the appendix unnecessarily the Court may
impose the cost of producing such parts on
the party. 11
The motion probably should be denied and the Clerk advised to contact
the parties and discuss the matter with them.
There is a reply.

11/5/75
PJN

Ginty

o
~-

-· ---

Court

voted on .................. , 19 . . .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced
................ , 19 . . .
' .

No. 1cl-J41l

vs.

•

HOLD
JURISDICTIONAL
NOT
CERT.
MERITS
MOTION ABFOR I-----..---1---S.-T_A_TE_,M,---EN---rT--+--..---+--.----1 SENT VOTG
D
N
POST DIS
AFF
REV
AFF
G
D
ING

Rehnquist, J ................. .
Powell, J .... ........ .... .. .. .
Blackmun, J ................. .
Marshall, J .................. .
White, J ..................... .
Stewart, J .................. . .
Brennan, J ................... .
Douglas, J .................... .
Burger, Ch. J ................ .

r

~.

...

' t

II
Ii
4ij

ill

II

tl
II

lj

I

p

rl

II

t"t

!!
·t

t)'.,

I

Jl

,rl

'l

;;.:•

'I
I

I

.\ !
'I

!

<f.·

>.
:.

3·

.

7'~~~~~

~~

'

f. E-,..,y~ c ~ 7

.

~J·
II

il

n
!•1.'

,,

I

l

·j''j'''1

·. · ~: 't

•

.·~'I'~·

~~

&-)

"j ~ "~u"tk;:f

~..-

;...'"lA-. --<..

,, .£.q_

I.

business now conducted by General Outdoor"; Robbins was an outdoor advertising man, not a real estate salesman.
Indeed, at a later point the Statement
explicitly noted that General Outdoor
would transfer to this Skogmo subsidiary "its entire outdoor advertising business", which would "continue to be managed by the same officers and substantially the same directors as General Outdoor". Moreover, many, probably most,
of the GOA stockholders receiving the
Proxy Statement of September 11, 1963,
had received, only ·five months earlier,
GOA's quarterly letter of April 11, 1963,
quoting the resolution, adopted by its directors on that day, announcing that
GOA would continue to operate its outdoor advertising plants with the sole exception of Oklahoma City. While, according to Robbins, this resolution was
passed to improve employee morale, the
combination of it with the lack of further plant sales (save the closing of the
Oklahoma City sale) contributed to the
misleading character of the statement of
intention in the Proxy Statement.
We recognize that, in thus branding
the Proxy Statement as misleading, the
district judge and we possess an advantage of hindsight that was not available
to the draftsman. It would not have
been proper to say that Skogmo was
going to sell all the remaining plants,
when, even with the encouragement that
had been received, there was no assurance that it could do this on satisfactory
terms. But the English language has
sufficient resources that the draftsman
could have done better than he did and
more accurately expressed Skogmo's true
intention to the stockholders. If only
the first sentence of the fateful para16. Our discussion of this voint is limited
to the rights of versons who were in·
vitcu by a proxy statement to t>articipatc
in the taking of cort>orate action involving
a change in the cbaractcr of their
securities, as in a sale of assets or a consolidation or merger. It docs not include
persons who bave traded bc(·ause of information in such a proxy statement, for
wbom the statement would seem to stand
no differently from, say, an annual re-

graph had said something like "including a policy of aggressively seeking to
dispose of the remaining outdoor advertising branches or subsidiaries of General Outdoor through sales to acceptable
prospective purchasers on advantageous
terms in the range of those that have
been achieved in the past," we would at
least have had a very different case.
What Is the Standard of Culpability in Suits Tor Darnages for Violation of Rule V,a-9?
In contrast to the large quantity of
ink that has been spilled on the issue
whether a plaintiff seeking damages under Rule 10b- 5 must make some showing
of "scienter" and, if so, what, there has
been little discussion of what a plaintiff
alleging ama e ecause o a VJO a ·on
of~ ) must show in the way
of culpability o~part of a
defendant. 1 6 Neither of the Supreme
Court decision~ac
tions un er section 14(a), J. I. Case Co.
v. ~ S. 426, 84 S.Ct.
1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423, or Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct.
616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970), casts light
on the pr.obleJil.
Judge Bartels held, 298 F.Supp. at 97,
that "the basis for incorporating scienter into a Rule 10b-5 action does not exist in a Rule 14a- 9 suit," and that "Negligence alone either in making a misrepresentation or in failing to disclose a
material fact in connection with proxy
solicitation is sufficient to warrant recovery." The judge agreed in substance
with Judge Mansfield's analysis in Richland v. Crandall, supra, 262 F.Supp. at
553 n.12, to the effect that one strong
ground for holding that Rule 10b-5 reB.

port to stockhohlers. \Yc likewise tlo not
pass on the J>rindples that should govern
liability of tlirc(·tors and other indivitluals
having some res]>onsibility for sudt a
statement, as distinguished from a controlling corporation which has been the
hcncfitiary of the action that was induecd.
See Jennings & Marsh, Securities Regulation: Cases nnd Materials 1358-5!) (3d
eel. 1972).
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Cite as 478 F.2d 1281 (1973)

quires a showing of something more
than negligence in an action for damages is that the statutory authority for
the Rule, section 10 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, is addressed to "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," a point later
stressed in the writer's concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 868 (2 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 1454, 22 L.
Ed.2d 756 (1969), whereas section 14(a)
contains no such evil-sounding language.
We think there is much force in this.
See Gould v. American Hawaiian S. S.
Co., 351 F.Supp. 853, 861- 863 (D.Del.
1972) ; 5 Loss, Securities Regulation
2864- 65 (2d ed. supp.1969). Although
the language of Rule 14a- 9(a) closely
parallels that of Rule 10b-5, and neither
says in so many words that scienter
should be a requirement, one of the primary reasons that this court has held
that this is required in a private action
under Rule 10b-5, Shemtob v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2
Cir. 1971); Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277, 1304, 1305 (2 Cir. 1973),
is a concern that without some such requirement the Rule might be invalid as
exceeding the Commission's authority
under section 10(b) to regulate "manipulative or deceptive devices." See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra, 401 F.2d
at 868 (Friendly, J., concurring); Lan-

I

17 . For similar reasons, we do not think
that this court's rN'Cnt hohling in Chrisf'mft Irulustries, In('. v. Piver Aircraft
Corp., supra, 480 F.2d at 362, that
scienter must be proved in a private aetion
under sed ion 1-1 (c) of the Securities Exchange Act, in whic-h Congress in 1968
acloptcd the language of Rule 10b- 5 and
applied it to tenclcr offen.;, is inconsistent
with the result we reach here. In that
connection Judge Mansfield noted, 480 F.
2d at 397:
Congress' usc of the words "fraudulent," "def"eptive" and "manivulath·e"
in § 14 (e), when coupled with the
vartially simi lar language atul the legislative history of the carlicr-cna<-tcd §
lO(b), indieates that its tmrpo~c was not
to Jlunish mere ncgligcnrc
18.

It has hccn arguccl that imtlosing liability for negligent misrepresentations or

za v. Drexel & Co., supra, 479 F.2d at
1305; 3 Loss, supra, at 1766 (2d ed.
1962); 6 id. at 3883-85 (Supp.1969).
In contrast, the scope of the rulemaking
~~
authority
granted under section 14(a )'IS
ing to a! proxy regulation
''necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors" and not limited by any words connoting fraud or deception. This language suggests that rather than emphasizing the prohibition of fraudulent conduct on the part of insiders to a securities transaction, as we think section
10(b) does, in section 14(a) Congress
was somewhat more concerned with protection of the outsider whose proxy is
being solicited. Indeed, it was this as- ~
pect of the statute that the Supreme
Court emphasized in recognizing a private right of action for violation of section 14(a) in Borak, 377 U.S. at 431432, 84 S.Ct. 1555. 11 We note also that
while an open-ended readin
of Rule
10b-5 would render the express civ1 liabl 1 y prOVISIOnS 0
ts
large y super ous, an be inconsistent
~ons Congress built into
these sections, see SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., supr·a, 401 F.2d at 867-868;
3 Loss, supm, at 1785, a reading of Rule
14a- 9 as imposing liability without
scienter in a case like the present is
completely compatible with the statutory
scheme. 1 s
omissions under Rule 14a-0 would be inconsistent with the congression:1 l intent in
enacting section 18 of the Hl3-l •\ ct, 15
U.S.C. § 78r, whieh expressly ··reate;; liability in a private <·ivil adion for making
materially false or misleading ,taterueuts
in any document filed with t L.;> Commission but proviclcs that no linbil: ry shall be
imposed if the dcfcn<lan t "ae t .;-.J in good
faith ami h:td no knowledge that such
statement was fa lse anrl misle a •! i ng." Sec
Gould v. American Ilawaiinn S.S. Co.,
supra, 3ril F.Suvp. at 863. But section
18 atlplics bro:ully to any do< t:::J en t filed
wi'th the Commission, whcrea.-.: >-ection 14
was spe<:ifically <li rcctc<l at vn: xy regulation. :\Iorcovct·, most of the _2 ,_ ·uments
within the scope of section IS :1 ::-.:> not distributed to stoc.:k hold crs fot· th e : -.J r~..ose of
inducing
adion;
we
se~
n o thing
anomalous about applying :1 C:.L"ierent
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by Judge Bartels, 298 F.Supp. 66 (E.D.
N.Y.1969), 332 F.Supp. 644 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), and 348 F.Supp. 979 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), along with two elaborate reports
by the special master, Arthur H.
Schwartz, Esq., on the amount of damages, a_ttest to the problems which the
1scognition of a private right of actiOn
for violation of§ 14(a) in D. Case Co.
~. 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12
L.Ed.2d 423 (1964), have thrust upon
the federal courts, and ·also the asSiduity
with which the judge and the special
master tackled them.
I. The Facts
The facts are stated in such detail in
Judge Bartels' first opinion, 298 F.Supp.
at 74- 89, that we can limit ourselves to
those that are vital for understanding
the issues on appeal. In order to make
the following summary more enlightening, it will be well to state at the outset
that the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint "concerning the Proxy Statement
sent to GOA's stockholders was that its
~~
disclosure that Skogmo expected to real~·. ,; ~ i;e farge profits from the disposition of
~., _.l!uch of GOA's advertising plants as had
~not been sold at the date of the merger
J .. ,t.V
w_3s jnad~ate.
.
ru
GOA had been the largest company in
the outdoor advertising business in the
United States. It had also acquired over
96% of the stock of Claude Neon Advertising, Limited, the largest outdoor advertising company in Canada, and all the
stock of Vendor, S.A., the largest such
company in Mexico. Skogmo was a company engaged in wholesale and retail
merchandising of durable and soft goods
through subsidiaries, franchised dealers,
and discount centers in the United
States and Canada, and related activities.
Between April, 1961 and March, 1962,
Skogmo acquired 50.12% of GOA's common stock. Bertin C. Gamble, chairman
of the board of directors and controlling
stockholder of Skogmo, was elected to

JY1;

GOA's board in October, 1961. He was
followed by Roy N. Gesme, a former
consultant to Skogmo, who was to act as
liaison between the two companies. Two
Skogmo vice presidents were added to
the GOA board in April, 1962. In the
same month Gamble engaged Donald E.
Ryan, who had no previous experience in
the outdoor advertising business, as an
officer of GOA, primarily in charge of
the sale of plants, and had him elected
as a member of the board and executive
vice president of GOA; the district
court found, 298 F.Supp. at 75, that
"Ryan was indisputably Skogmo's man
at General and was expected to evaluate
General's prospects and make recommendations to Skogmo for the future."
There were seven other directors. Four,
including Burr L. Robbins, the president
of GOA, had been associated with GOA
before Skogmo's acquisition of control;
three were outsiders. Despite the fact
that only five of the twelve directors
were Skogmo men, Skogmo does not dispute that it had effective control of
GOA.
Beginning in 1961 the outdoor advertising business began to encounter serious difficulties. Disappointing reports,
indicating that income from advertising
plants had fallen off substantially during 1961 and that the expected rate of
return in the business was declining,
were made to Gesme by the management
in the early months of 1962. Upon assuming his duties in May 1962, Ryan,
after an intensive study, reported to
Gamble that GOA's advertising plants
could not be operated profitably and
should be sold. A strong impulse in
that direction had been furnished by the
sale, in January 1962, of GOA's St.
Louis plant to a competitor at a price
described as "fantastic".l After this
sale, Gesme had prepared a detailed report on the property and earnings of
each of GOA's plants, referred to as the
"Green Book", which listed sales prices
for the plants, apparently calculated on

I. The price was $2,953,000, of which $653,000 was in cash and the balance in notes, as againH
a book value of $879,000.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Greg Palm

DATE:

March 4, 1976

No. 74-1471 TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.
I.

Appropriate Standard of Materiality under § 14(a).
The purpose

of § 14(a) is "to promote 'the free exercise

of the voting rights of stockholders' by insuring that proxies
would be solicited with 'explanation to the stockholder of
the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast
his vote is sought."' Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 381 (1970), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1385 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12.
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).

See

Section 14(a)

was thus intended to promote "[f]air corporate suffrage"
H.R. Rep., supra, at 13, by conveying information to shareholders that should be important in the decisionmaking process.
SEC Rule 14a-9 thus proscribes solicitations "containing any
statement which . . . is false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact
necessary to make the statements therein not false or
misleading . . . • "

In Borak the Court recognized a private

cause of action for violations of the rule and in Mills
liability was made to turn solely upon the question whether
\

I

the statement or omission was "material".

The reasoning of

2.
the Mills Court essentially was that the section and rule
are designed to insure that all information that may be
significant in the decisionmaking process is conveyed to the
shareholders.

1

I

The concern of the rule is fair corporate

suffrage, not the inherent fairness or unfairness of a particular

deal.
The central question in this case is how to define the

concept of materiality.

CA7 defines material as including

"all facts which a reasonable investor might consider important."
(emphasis supplied).

For the reasons elaborated by Judge

Friendly in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281
(2d Cir. 1973), I think that this "might" test is inappropriate
because it is "too suggestive of mere possibility, however
unlikely."

The Gerstle court cited with favor two alternative

formulations of what appears* to be a more stringent standard:
(1) whether "a reasonable man would attach importance [to the
fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in
the transaction in question, id. (emphasis supplied); (2)
whether "taking a properly realistic view, there is a substantial
likelihood that the misstatement or omission may have led a
·ki say "appears" only because much of the difference here may

properly be characterized as alternative word choice for the
same concept. CA7, for example, thought that the use of the
word "reasonable" properly circumscribed the materialiti test,
noting that it "will not reach 'trivial' and 'unrelated facts;
neither will it fail to reach facts which may be relevant
for some, but not for others." Pet. A.9.

3.
stockholder to grant a proxy to the solicitor or to withhold
one from the other side, whereas in the absence of this he
\l

would have taken a contrary course.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

Although either of these formulations would point to the same
conclusion in most cases, I prefer formulation (1) since when
applied by lower courts formulation (2) may become tangled up
in the notion of causality that was rejected in Mills.**
I would, however, perhaps modify formulation (1) to the extent
of requi ting only that there be a "significant likelihood"
that a "reasonable investor" "would" consider the information
"important" in arriving at a decision.

The addition of the

"significant likelihood" language would be consistent with
Mills and the broad disclosure purpose of§ 14(a). ( I'm somewhat ambivalent about the addition of this language.

I think

that it is sound law, but am not sure that lower courts would
not run away with it.)
All that the Court can do in this case is to state the
standard, and then elaborate upon it (i.e., by indicating
that an important fact is not a fact which necessarily would
have been controlling in a reasonable shareholder's mind in
arriving at a decision; on the other hand it must be a fact
which necessarily would have been controlling in a reasonable
:;t_.,\"Either formulation, however, is probably acceptable. The
SEC argues the test should be: "whether the misstatement or
omission has a significant propensity to affect the judgment
of a reasonable shareholder in the process of deciding how
to vote." SEC Brief 4. This standard is close to formulation
(2).

4.
shareholder's mind in arriving at a decision; on the other
hand it must be a fact that a reasonable (rational) investor
would have considered significant facts that only a few
investors would consider important, or which even the hypothetical
reasonable man might consider important are not material).

None

of the cases which I have read contain any totally satisfactory
method of elaborating on the test.

Thus, much of the elaboration

will have to come in terms of the Court's discussion of the
various material deficiencies that CA7 identified in the TSC
Proxy.
As a matter of "policy" I think that Judge Friendly
identified the key reason for requiring a standard of materiality
higher than that required by CA7.

As he notes in Gerstle the

language and purpose of § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 strongly suggest
that there should be no requirement of scienter to establish
a violation.

But if one is going to impose civil liability

(a judicially created remedy) for misstatements or omissions
it is appropriate that one impose a fairly high standard of
relevance.

In view of the purposes of the section and rule

it is also important that the standard of materiality not be
made too broad for the shareholders will be buried in an
avalanche of information making it more difficult for the
average investor to make reasoned decisions.

5.
II.

Application of the Test
CA7 granted summary judgment based on three sets of

facts.

I will discuss them separately below.

It is my

conclusion that only one of the sets of facts relied on is even
arguably material as a matter of law.

Moreover, several of

the facts relied on are clearly not material under any reasonable
test.
A.

Indicia of Control.

CA7 initially focused on two sets of acts relating to
Northway's potential influence over TSC management.

First,

three reports that National and TSC had filed with the SEC
it was stated that under SEC regulations National may be
deemed a "parent" of TSC.

Second, the statement also failed

to show that at the time the TSC board considered the
proposed merger transaction the chairman was Stanley Yarmuth,
National's president, and the chairman of the TSC executive
committee was Charles Simonelli, National's executive vice
president.

CA7 found both these facts to be material as a

matter of law.

I disagree.

The proxy statement indicated
~ii)P

quite clearly that five of TSC' s ten directors were u ·
nominees.

Moreover, it indicated that

\:

t!d\•~

•

·

,; owned 34% of

TSC's stock and that no other shareholder owned over 10%.
Given the disclosure of these facts which clearly suggest the
possibility of control of TSC by

"'~C)~\

I think that the

omission of the existence of the "parent" filings certainly

'

is not material.

.

6.

Although a closer question I also do not

believe that the omission of Yarmuth's and Simonelli's
positions at TSC is material.

The proxy statements revealed

their positions at Northway and that they were on the TSC
board.

My current view is that the additional information

regarding their TSC board positions is merely cummulative evidence
of control and arguably not material as a matter of law.
(The contrary view would emphasize the substantially greater
influence directors in these positions presumably would have
on board decisions).
B.

Hornblower Opinion on Value of National's Warrants.

Petitioner's Reply Brief contains an excellent discussion
of why the omission of the letter referring to the value of
the Northway warrants is not a material omission from the
proxy statement.

See pp. 23-32.

CAl's view essentially is

that the statement by Hornblower that TSC shareholders were
being offered a "substantial premium over current market values"
coupled with the tables containing the market prices of the
Northway warrants on given dates makes the omission of a letter
from Hornblower indicating that the "value" of the warrants
was less than their market price (at least in comparison to
the figures in the proxy statement)

CAl's view is silly.

a material omission.

The proxy statement indicates only that

the shareholders will be receiving a substantial premium over
current market values.

Moreover, it indicates that market

7.
prices were only one factor considered in reaching the conclusion
that the market prices given in the statement are an accurate
barometer of value or of the size of the premium.

The SEC

requires that the market prices be included in the statement.
Northway correctly points out that the true "premium" must be
calculated after filtering out any appreciation in the value
of TSC common shares because of the announcement of the exchange
offer.

My current view is that the omission of the information

contained in this letter was not material as a matter of law.
It is evident that the investment bankers properly considered
many factors other than current market prices in giving their
opinion and a proxy statement cannot be expected to define
their chain of reasoning in detail.
C.

Purchases of National Securities
CA7 also found

materia~

of the fact that both

?"dt

a matter of law the omission

g and th:?idPund, Inc.,

had acquired a substantial number of

convertible

debentures and common stock during the 19-month interval
preceding the proxy solicitation. ]~ir transactions amounted
~olh~
to about 8. 5% of the total
g common shares traded.
u

CA7 considered Madison purchases to be material because the
chairman of National's board is a director of Madison and
because the president of Madison is a consultant of National
($12,000 annual retainer).

The implication that CA7

considered derivable from this information was that National

8.

and Madison were coordinating their purchases to artifically
raise the price of

Jrtrtt:;t

stock.

The argument is that even

if there in fact was no coordination of purchases this information should have been revealed to the shareholders to that
they could make their own informed decision.

I suppose that

it might not be wholly unreasonable to require the Madison
purchases to be revealed.

But if in fact there was no
Ncdri~

co-ordination then it is quite likely that 77
considered this a material fact.

ln us never

Moreover, even if they did

reveal these purchases they would also have to state their view
that there was no coordinated purchase plan since if in fact
there was no such plan then the unexplained information would
mislead the shareholders in the opposite way.

All this drives

home the point that there may be some real value in not forcing
the proxy solicitor to go through the silly exercise of
transmitting facts only to say that because of other facts they
are not material and may be disregarded.

There is, however, a

strong reason for requiring the purchases here to be disclosed
since it is a somewhat subjective judgment whether Madison
in fact did not continue its purchases in order to bolster
1 ~
lE ' g stock for purposes of the TSC deal (after all, if
they were successful in "puffing" the value of the shares the
"puff" might in part become real once they had acquired TSC
at a bargain rate), and this is the type of judgment § 14(a)
and Rule 14a-9 arguably have left to the shareholders.
(As you can tell, I am somewhat uncertain about what to do

9.

about this last set of information.

.

Imposing civil liability

for nondisclosure does seem rather harsh on these facts.)
~,,

own purchases similarly are not clearly

material.

Many corporations do purchase their shares on a

If that is the reason for the purchases here and
they can be expected to continue unabated in the future then
there may be no reason to require disclosure.

Petitioners do

not make this argument, however, and I'm not yet certain why
Northway was purchasing its s hares (I intend to look further
tonight).
A final question to be asked as to these facts is whether,
as a matter of law, 8.5% is a "material" amount of purchases.
To be sure these purchases would affect market prices, but I
am not certain that the "effect" (i.e., depending on the
market prices may have been raised several percent) is per se
material".

I think that it probably is, but want to think

further on the subject tonight.
III.

Remand

A remand will be necessary in any case since CA7 declined
to pass on respondents' argument that the proposal was never
legally approved under Delaware law because only 4 of 10 directors
voted.

CA7 should be given an opportunity to consider this

question first.

G.P.
ss
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No. 74-1471 -- TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The pr_oxy rules promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 bar the use of proxy statements that are false or misleading with respect to the presentation or omission of material
facts.

We are called upon to consider. the definition of a material

fact under those rules, and the appropriateness of resolving the
question of materiality by summary judgment in this case.

I

The dispute in this case centers about the acquisition of
petitioner TSC Industries, Inc. by petitioner National Industries,
Inc.

In February 1969 National acquired 34 o/o of TSC's voting

securities by purchase from Charles E. Schmidt and his family.
Schmidt, who had been TSC' s founder and principal shareholder,
promptly resig ne d along with his son from TSC' s board of directors ..

- 2 -

Thereafter, five National nominees were placed on TSC' s board,
Stanley R. Yarmuth, National's president and chief executive
officer, became chairman of the TSC board, and Charles F.
Simonelli, National's executive vice president, became chairman
of the TSC executive committee.

On October 16, 1969, the TSC

board, with the attending National nominees abstaining, approved
a proposal to liquidate and sell all of TSC' s assets to National.
The proposal in substance provided for the exchange of TSC
Common and Series 1 Preferred Stock for National Series B
Preferred Stock and Warrants . .!/ On November 12, 1969, TSC and
National issued a joint proxy statement to their shareholders,
recommending approval of the proposal.

The proxy solicitation

was successful, TSC was placed in liquidation and dissolution,
and the exchange of shares was effected.
This is an action brought by respondent Northway, a TSC
shareholder, against TSC and National, claiming that their joint
proxy statement was incomplete and materially misleading in
violation of § 14a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1834, 15 U.S. C.
§

78n(a),~/

and Ru1es 14a-3 and 14a-9 promulgated thereunder.

3/

17 CFR §§ 240. 14a-3, 240. 14a-9 (1975).-

The basis of Northway's

.....___

claim under Rule 14a-3 is that TSC and National failed to state in
the proxy statement that the transfer of the Schmidt interests in

- 3 -

TSC to National had given National control of TSc.!/ The Rule
14a-9 claim, insofar as it concerns us,2../ is that TSC and National
omitted from the proxy statement material facts relating to the degree
of National 1 s control over TSC and the favorability of the terms of

6/

the proposal to TSC shareholders.-

Northway filed its complaint in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 4, 1969,
the day before the shareholder meeting on the proposed transaction,
but while it requested injunctive relief it never so moved.

In 1972

Northway amended its complaint to seek money damages, restitution,
and other equitable relief.

Shortly thereafter, Northway moved for

summary judgment on the issue of TSC 1 s and National 1 s liability.
The District Court denied the motion, but granted leave to appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1292(b).

The Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that there existed a
genuine issue of fact as to whether National 1 s acquisition of the
Schmidt interests in TSC had resulted in a change of control,
and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate on the Rule
14a-3 claim.

But the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court 1 s

------- --

denial of summary judgment to Northway on its 14a-9 claims, holding

-

- .....
that certain omissions of fact were material as a matter of law.
....._

512 F. 2 d 3 24 ( CA 7 19 7 5) •

cwt - - . . -....

~

- 4 -

We granted certiorari because the standard applied by the
Court of Appeals in resolving the question of materiality appeared
to conflict with the standard applied by other Courts of Appeals.
423 U.S. 820 (1975).

We now hold that the Court of Appeals erred

in ordering that partial summary judgment be granted to Northway.

II

A.
As we have noted on more than one occasion, § 14a of the
Exchange Act "was intended to promote 'the free exercise of the
voting rights of stockholders' by ensuring that proxies would be
solicited with 'explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of
the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought. '"
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970), quoting
H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13.
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 12.

See also J. I. Case

(1964); S. Rep. No. 792,

In Borak, the Court held that§ 14a's

broad remedial purposes required recognition under § 27 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78aa, of an implied private right of action
for violations of the provision.

And in Mills, we attempted to clarify

to some extent the elements of a private cause of action for violation
of § 14a.

In a suit challenging the sufficiency under § 14a and Rule 14a- 9

of a proxy statement soliciting votes in favor of a merger, we held
that there was no need to demonstrate that the alleged defect in the

- 5 -

'

.

proxy statement actually had a decisive effect on the voting.

So

long as the misstatement or omission was material, it is sufficient
to show the causal relation between violation and injury, we concluded.
that "the proxy solicitation itself . • . was an "essential link in
the accomplishment of the transaction." 39 6 U.S., at 385.

After

Mills, then, the content given to the notion of materiality assumes

71

· ht ene d s1gm
· ·f·1cance.h e1g

B.
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an

..

-

objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.

Variations in the formulation

of a general test of materiality occur in the articulation of just how
significant a fact must be or, put another way. how certain it must
be that the fact would affect a reasonable investor's judgment.
The Court of Appeals in this case concluded that material
facts include "all facts which a reasonable shareholder might consider
important." 512 F. 2d, at 330 (emphasis added).

This formulation

) of the test of materiality has been explicitly rejected by at least two

1 courts

as setting too low a threshold for the imposition of liability

under Rule 14a-9.

Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 1281, 1301-

1302 ( CA 2 1973); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579,
603-604 (CA 5 1974).

In these cases, panels of the Second and Fifth

'.

- 6 -

Circuits opted for the conventional tort test of materiality -whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the fact
misrepresented or omitted in determining his course of action.
See Restatement, Torts § 538(2)(a).

See also ALI Federal Securities

8/

Code §256(a), Tent. Draft No. 2 (1973).-

Gerstle v. Gamble-

Skogmo, supra, at 1302, also approved the following standard, which
had been formulated with reference to statements issued in a
contes.t ed election: "whether, taking a properly realistic view,
there is a substantial likelihood that the misstatement or omission
may have led a stockholder to grant a proxy to the solicitor or to
withhold one from the other side, whereas in the absence of this he
would have take n a contrary course." General Time Corp. v.
Talley Industries , Inc .• 403 F. 2d 159, 162 (CA 2 1968), cert. denied,
393

u.s.

1026 (1 9 69).

In arriving at its broad definition of a material fact as one
that a reasonable shareholder might consider important, the Court
of Appeals in this case relied heavily upon language of this Court
in Mills v. El ectric Auto-Lite Co., supra. This reliance was
misplaced.

The 1\Iills Court did characterize a determination of

materiality as at least "embod[ying] a conclusion that the defect was
of such a character that it might have been considered important by
a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to

- 8 -

to ensure by judicial means that the transaction, when judged by
its real terms, is fair and otherwise ad e quate, but to ensure
disclosures by corporate management in order to enable the
shareholders to make an informed choice.
381.

See Mills, supra, at

As an ab s tract proposition, the most desirable role for a court

in a suit of this sort, coming after the consummation of the proposed

transaction, would perhaps be to determine whether in fact the
proposal would have been favored by the shareholders and consummated
in the absence of any misstatement or omission.

But as we recognized

in Mills, supra, at 382 n. 5, such matters are not subject to determina-

tion with certainty. Doubts as to the critical nature of information
misstated or omitted will be commonplace.

And particularly in view

of the prophylactic purpose of the Rule and the fact that the content
of the proxy statement is within management's control, it is
appropriate that these doubts be resolved in favor of those the
statute is designed to protect.

Mills, supra, at 385.

We are aware, however, that the disclosure policy embodied
....,

in the proxy regulations is not without limit.

...,

,....

awa=--==--

See id., at 384.

Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its
disclosure may accomplish more harm than good.

The potential liability

for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if the standard of .
materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may corporations and their

- 9 -

managements be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions
or misstatements. but also management's fear of exposing itself
to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholder

in an avalanche of trivial information -- a result that is hardly
conducive to informed decisionmaking.

Precisely these dangers are

presented, we think. by the definition of a material fact adopted by
the Court of Appeals in this case -- a fact which a reasonable shareholder
might consider important.

We agree with Judge Friendly, speaking for

the Court of Appeals in Gerstle. that the "might" formulation is "too
suggestive of mere possibility, however unlikely." 478 F. 2d ••
at 1302.
The general standard of materiality that we think best
comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: an omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonab}e

...,

~

._,.

......

shareholfle.r would consider it important in deciding how to vote.
:w::=m

........ ~

~

............

taw:=

......

This standard is fully consistent with Mills' general description of
materiality as a requirement that "the defect have a significant
"10/
propensity to affect the voting process. It does not require
proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.

What

the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihooq
that. under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have

- 11 -

- 10 -

assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder.

Put another way, there must be a substantial

likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the "total mix" of information made available . .!.!./

D.
The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed
question of law and fact, involving as it does the application of a
legal standard to particular set of facts.

In considering whether

121
. dgmen t on th e 1ssue
.
. appropna
. t e,summary JU
1s
we must b ear
in mind that the underlying objective facts, which will often be free
from dispute, are merely the starting point for the ultimate determination of materiality.

The determination requires a delicate

assessment of the inferences a "reasonable shareholder" would
draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences
to him, and these assessments are peculiarly

13/

fact.-

~nes

for the trier of

Only if the established omissions are "so obviously

important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on
the question of materiality'' is the ultimate issue of materiality
appropriately resolved "as a matter of law" by summary judgment.
John Hopkins University-v. Hutton, 422 F. 2d 1124, 1129 (CA 4 1969). ·
See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 604 (CA 5 1974);

- 12 -

exchange with National.

It then concluded that the omitted facts

were material because they were "persuasive indicators that the
TSC board was in fact under the control of National, and that
National thus 'sat on both sides of the table' in setting the terms
of the exchange." 512 F. 2d, at 333.

-

We do not agree that the omission of these facts, when
viewed against the disclosures contained in the proxy statement,

-

warrants the entry of summary judgment against TSC and National
-------------~

on this record.

Our conclusion is the same whether the omissions

are considered separately or together.
The proxy statement prominently displayed the facts that
National owned 34o/o of the outstanding shares in TSC, and that no
other person owned more than 10%.

App. 262-263,267.

It also

prominently revealed that five out of ten TSC directors were
National nominees, and it recited the positions of those National
nominees with National -- indicating, among other things, that
Stanley Yarmuth was president and a director of National, and that
Charles Simonelli was executive vice president and a director of
National.

App. 2 67.

These disclosures clearly revealed the nature

~~------~--~~~--------------~

of National's relationship with TSC and alerted the reasonable share-

,~------------~,~--~--------~----

holder to the fact that National exercised a degree of influence over
TSC.

In view of these disclosures, we certainly cannot say that the

- 13 -

additional facts that Yarmuth was chairman of the TSC board of
directors and Simonelli chairman of its executive committee were,
on this record, so obviously important that reasonable minds could
not differ on their materiality.
Nor can we say that it was materially misleading as a
matter of law for TSC and National to have omitted reference to
SEC filings indicating that National "may be deemed to be a parent
of TSC." As we have already noted, both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals concluded, in denying summary judgment on the
Rule 14a-3 claim, that there was a genuine issue of fact as to
whether National actually controlled TSC at the time of the proxy
solicitation.

We must assume for present purposes, then, that

National did not control TSC.

On that assumption, TSC and

National obviously had no duty to state without qualification that
control did exist.

If the proxy statements were to disclose the

conclusory statements in the SEC filings that National

11

may be

deemed to be a parent of TSC," then it would have been appropriate,
if

not necessary, for the statement to have included a disclaimer

of National control over TSC or a disclaimer of knowledge as to

15/

whether National controlled TSC.-

The net contribution of

including the contents of the SEC filings accompanied by such

- 14 -

disclailners is not of such obvious significance, in view of the
other facts contained in the proxy statement, that their exclusion
renders the statement materially misleading as a matter of law ):.2../
B.

Favorability of the Terms to TSC Shareholders
The Court of Appeals also found that the failure to disclose

two sets of facts rendered the proxy statement materially deficient
in its presentation of the favorability of the terms of the proposed
transaction to TSC shareholders.

The first omission was of

information, described by the Court of Appeals as "bad news" for
TSC shareholders, contained in a letter from an investment

banki~g

firm whose earlier favorable opinion of the fairness of the proposed
transaction was reported in the proxy statement.

The second omission

related to purchases of National common stock by National and by
Madison Fund, Inc., a large mutual fund, during the two years
prior to the issuance of the proxy state ment.

1.
The proxy statement revealed that the investment banking
firm of Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes had rendered a
favorable opinion on the fairness to TSC shareholders of the terms
for the exchange of TSC shares for National securities.

In that

opinion, the proxy statement explained, the firm had considered,
"among other things, the current market prices of the securities

'·
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of both corporations, the high redemption price of the National
Series B Preferred Stock, the dividend and debt service requirements
of both corporations, the substantial premium over current market
values represented by the securities being offered to TSC stockholders, and the increased dividend income." App. 2 67.
The Court of Appeals focused upon the reference to the
"substantial premium over current market values represented
by the securities being offered to TSC stockholders," and noted
that any TSC shareholder could calculate the apparent premium by
reference to the table of current market prices that appeared four
pages later in the proxy statement.

App. 271.

On the basis of the

recited closing prices for November 7, 1969, ,five days before the issuance
of the proxy statement, the apparent premiums were as follows.
Each share of TSC Series 1 Preferred, which closed at $12.00,

-

would bring National Series B Preferred Stock and National Warrants
worth $15.23 --for a premium of $3 . 23, or 27% of the market value
of the TSC Series 1 Preferred.

Each share of TSC Common Stock,

which closed at $13. 25, would bring National Series B Preferred
Stock and National Warrants worth $16. 19 -- for a premium of $2. 94,
or 22% of the market value of TSC Common.12/
The closing price of the National Warrants on November 7, 1969,
was, as indicated in the proxy statement, $5. 25.

The TSC shareholders

- 16 -

were misled, the Court of Appeals concluded, by the proxy
statement's failure to disclose that in a communication two we eks
after its favorable opinion letter, the Hornblower firm revealed
that its determination of the fairness of the offer to TSC was based
on the conclusion that the value of the Warrants involved in the
transaction would not be their current market price, but approximately
$3. 50.

If the Warrants were valued at $3.50 rather than $5. 25, and

the other securities valued at the November 7 closing price, the
Court figured, the apparent premium would be substantially reduced -from $3. 23 (27o/o) to $ 1.48 (12o/o) in the case of TSC Preferred, and
from $2.94 (22 o/o) to$. 31 (2o/o) in the case of TSC Common.

"In

simple terms," the Court concluded, "TSC and National had received
some good news and some bad news from the Hornblower firm.

They

chose to publish the good news and omit the bad news." 512 F. 2d, at 335.
It would appear, however, that the subsequent communication

from the Hornblower firm, which the Court of Appeals felt contained
"bad news," contained nothing new at all.

At the TSC board of

directors meeting held on October 16, 19 69, the date of the initial
Hornblower opinion letter, Blancke Noyes, a TSC director and a partner
in the Hornblower firm, had pointed out the likelihood of a decline
in the market price of National Warrants with the issuance of the
additional Warrants involved in the exchange, and reaffirmed his

}

- 17 -

conclusion that the exchange offer was a fair one nevertheless.
The subsequent Hornblower letter. signed by Mr. Noyes.

----------~-------------

purported merely to explain the basis of the calculations underlying
the favorable opinion rendered in the October 16th letter.

"In

advising TSC as to the fairness of the offer from [National].
Mr. Noyes wrote. "we concluded that the warrants in question had
a value of approximately $3. 50." lfl/

On its face. then. the

subsequent letter from Hornblower does not appear to have contained
anything to alter the favorable opinion rendered in the October 16th
letter -- including the conclusion that the securities being offered
to TSC shareholders represented a "substantial premium over
current market values."
The real question. though. is not whether the subsequent
Hornblower letter contained anything that altered the Hornblower
opinion in any \vay.

It is rather whether the advice given at the

October 16th meeting. and reduced to more pre.cise terms in the
subsequent Hornblower letter -- that there may be a decline in the
market price of the National Warrants -- had to be disclosed in order
to clarify the import of the proxy statement's reference to "the
substantial premium over current market values represented by
the securities being offered to TSC stockholders." We note initially

'·

- 18 -

'

.

that the proxy statement referred to the substantial premium as
but one of several factors considered by Hornblower in rendering
its favorable opinion of the terms of exchange.

Still, we cannot

assume that a TSC shareholder would focus only on the "bottom line"
of the opinion to the exclusion of the considerations that produced it.
TSC and National insist that the reference to a substantial
premium required no clarification or supplementation, for the reason
that there was a substantial premium even if the National Warrants
are assumed to have been worth $3. 50.

In reaching the contrary

conclusion, the Court of Appeals, they contend, ignored the rise in
price of TSC securities between the early October 1969 reference
point for the Hornblower opinion and November 7. 1969 -- a rise in
price that they suggest was a result of the favorable exchange ratio's
becoming public knowledge.

When the proxy statement was mailed,

TSC and National contend, the market price of TSC securities
already reflected a protion of the premium to which Hornblower had
referred in rendering its favorable opinion of the terms of exchange.
Thus, they note that Hornblower assessed the fairness of the proposed
transaction by reference to early October market prices of TSC
Preferred, TSC Common, and National Preferred.

On the basis of

those prices and a $3. 50 value for the National Warrants involved
in the exchange. TSC and National contend that the premium was
substantial.

Each share of TSC Preferred, selling in early October
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at $11. would bring National Preferred Stock and Warrants worth
$13. 50 -- for a premium of $2. 10, or 19%. And each share of
in
TSC Common, selling/early October at $11. 63, would bring
National Preferred Stock and Warrants worth $13.25 --for a
19/
premium of $1. 62. or 14%.- We certainly cannot say as a matter
of law that these premiums were not substantial.

And if. as we must

assume in considering the appropriateness of summary judgment.
the increase in price of TSC' s securities from early October to
November 7 reflected in large part the market's reaction to the
terms of the proposed exchange, it was not materially misleading
as a matter of law for the proxy statement to refer to the existence
of a substantial premium.
There remains the possibility, however, that although TSC
and National may be correct in urging the existence of a substantial
premium based upon a $3. 50 value for the National Warrants and
the early October market prices of the other securities involved
in the transaction. the proxy statement misled the TSC shareholder
to calculate a premium substantially in excess of that premium.

-~<:~---------------~,--------------------------------------

The premiums apparent from early October market prices and
a $3. 50 value for the National Warrants -- 19% on TSC Preferred
and 14% on TSC Common-- were certainly less than those that would
have been derived through use of the November 7 closing prices listed

! '

- 20 -

in the proxy statement -- 27% on TSC Preferred and 22% on TSC

Common.

But we are unwilling to sustain a grant of summary

judgment to Northway on that basis.

To do so we would have to

conclude as a matter of law, first, that the proxy statement would
have misled the TSC shareholder to calculate his premium on the
basis of November 7 market prices, and second, that the difference
between that premium and that which would be apparent from early
October prices and a $3. 50 value for the National Warrants was
material.

These are questions we think best left to the trier of fact.

2.
The final omission that concerns us relates to purchases of
National Common Stock by National and by Madison Fund, Inc., a
mutual fund.

Northway notes that National's board chairman was a

director of Madison, and that Madison's president and chief executive,
Edward Merkle, was employed by National pursuant to an agreement
obligating him to provide at least one day per month for such duties
20/
as National might request.
Northway contends that the proxy
statement, having called the TSC shareholder's attention to the market
prices of the securities involved in the proposed transaction, should
have revealed substantial purchases of National Common Stock made
by National and l\ladison during the two years prior to the issuance
of the proxy statement.Q/ In particular, Northway contends that

l
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the TSC shareholders should, as a matter of law, have been informed
that National and Madison purchases accounted for 8. 5o/o of all
reported transactions in National Common Stock during the period
between National's acquisition of the Schmidt interests and the proxy
solicitation.

The theory behind Northway's contention is that

disclosure of these purchases would have pointed to the existence,
or at least the possible existence, of conspiratorial manipulation of
the price of National Common Stock. which would have had an effect
on thE; market price of the National Preferred Stock and Warrants
involved in the proposed transaction.E./
Before the District Court, Northway attempted to demonstrate
that the National and Madison purchases were coordinated.

The

District Court concluded, however, that there was a genuine issue
of fact as to whether there was coordination.

Finding that a showing

of coordination was essential to Northway's theory, the District Court
denied summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that
"collusion is not conclusively established." 512 F. 2d, at 336.

But

observing that "it is certainly suggested, " ibid., the Court concluded
that the failure to disclose the purchases was materially misleading
as a matter of law.

The Court explained:
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"Stockholders contemplating an offer involving
preferred shares convertible to common stock
and warrants for the purchase of common stock
must be informed of circumstances which tend
to indicate that the current selling price of the
common stock involved may be affected by apparent
market manipulations.

It was for the shareholders

to determine whether the market price of the common
shares was relevant to their evaluation of the
convertible preferred shares and warrants, or whether
the activities of Madison and National actually
amounted to manipulation at all." Ibid.
In short, while the Court of Appeals viewed the purchases as
significant only insofar as they suggested manipulation of the price
of National securities, and acknowledged the existence of a genuine
issue of fact as to whether there was any manipulation, the Court
nevertheless required disclosure to enable the shareholders to
decide whether there was manipulation or not.
The Court of Appeals' approach would sanction the imposition
of civil liability on a theory that undisclosed information may sug gest
the existence of market manipulation, even if the responsible corporate

-

officials knew that there was in fact no market manipulation.
.... ~

~

,. ..
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We do

- 23 -

not agree that Rule 14a-9 requires such a result.

Rule 14a-9 is

concerned only with whether a proxy statement is misleading with
respect to its presentation of material facts.

If, as we must assume

on a motion for summary judgment, there was no collusion or
manipulation whatsoever in the National and Madison purchases
that is, if the purchases were made wholly independently for proper
corporate and investment purposes, then by Northway's implicit
acknowledgment they had no bearing on the soundness and reliability
of the market prices listed in the proxy statement, ?:.ll and it cannot
have been materially misleading to fail to disclose them.

241

That is not to say, of course, that the SEC could not enact
a rule specifically requiring the disclosure of purchases such as were
involved in this case, without regard to whether the purchases can
be shown to have been collusive or manipulative.

We simply hold

that if liability is to be imposed upon a theory that it was misleading
to fail to disclose purchases suggestive of market manipulation,
.
.
.
.
25 /
there must be some showmg that there was 1n fact market mampulatwn.IV
In summary, none of the omissions claimed to have been in

violation of Rule 14a-9 were, so far as the record reveals, materially
misleading as a matter of law, and Northway was not entitled to

}

.~

.

- 24 -

partial summary judgment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals

is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
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